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The voting paradox … with a single voter? Implications for transitivity in choice under risk

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  • Butler, David
  • Blavatskyy, Pavlo

Abstract

The voting paradox occurs when a democratic society seeking to aggregate individual preferences into a social preference reaches an intransitive ordering. However it is not widely known that the paradox may also manifest for an individual aggregating over attributes of risky objects to form a preference over those objects. When this occurs, the relation ‘stochastically greater than’ is not always transitive and so transitivity need not hold between those objects. We discuss the impact of other decision paradoxes to address a series of philosophical and economic arguments against intransitive (cyclical) choice, before concluding that intransitive choices can be justified.

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  • Butler, David & Blavatskyy, Pavlo, 2020. "The voting paradox … with a single voter? Implications for transitivity in choice under risk," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(1), pages 61-79, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:36:y:2020:i:1:p:61-79_3
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    1. repec:cup:judgdm:v:15:y:2020:i:6:p:1052-1053 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:cup:judgdm:v:15:y:2020:i:6:p:1044-1051 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Michael H. Birnbaum, 2020. "Reanalysis of Butler and Pogrebna (2018) using true and error model," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 15(6), pages 1044-1051, November.
    4. David Butler, 2020. "Intransitive preferences or choice errors? A reply to Birnbaum," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 15(6), pages 1052-1053, November.

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