To Waive or Not to Waive: Questioning the Use of Legal Waivers in Business Human Rights

Legal waivers embedded in corporate settlement agreements are commonly framed as neutral devices of dispute resolution. They promise finality, prevent double recovery and manage litigation risk. Yet in practice, waivers function as structural tools of accountability avoidance. This article examines the use of legal waivers within operational-level grievance mechanisms, focusing on three dimensions: the UNGPs’ procedural formalism, the cost dynamics of corporate settlements, and the opacity created by confidentiality provisions. It argues that the UNGPs’ emphasis on process legitimacy neglects the substantive consequences of waivers, that cost volatility incentivises their routine use, and that confidentiality provisions entrench information asymmetry while obstructing judicial oversight. The article concludes by advancing a hybrid regulatory model which prohibits blanket confidentiality of terms governing settlement agreements and advocates for greater transparency through a differentiated disclosure regime and increased judicial scrutiny by domestic courts.