IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v99y2005i02p225-243_05.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Madison's Opponents and Constitutional Design

Author

Listed:
  • ROBERTSON, DAVID BRIAN

Abstract

Understanding what James Madison's opponents sought and won at the U.S. Constitutional Convention revises our understanding of the founders' original intentions for the durable framework that has structured American political development. The Constitution is the by-product of expedient accommodations forced on Madison. Madison sought broad national authority independent of state governments and a swift victory for population-based congressional representation. Delegates from economically disadvantaged states opposed these plans, seeking instead to nationalize only selective public goods, to maintain most state policy autonomy, and to minimize contingencies imposed by other governments. Connecticut's delegates, particularly Roger Sherman, played a pivotal role in spoiling Madison's agenda and altering his substantive plans for Constitutional design. Madison's Convention opponents are responsible for a Constitution that nationalized only enumerated public goods and imposed potentially high transaction costs on any further nationalization of policy authority. They helped make federalism a lasting political weapon used to win substantive policy outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Robertson, David Brian, 2005. "Madison's Opponents and Constitutional Design," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(2), pages 225-243, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:99:y:2005:i:02:p:225-243_05
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055405051622/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Stephen C. Phillips & Alex P. Smith & Peter R. Licari, 2022. "Philadelphia reconsidered: participant curation, the Gerry Committee, and US constitutional design," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 407-426, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:99:y:2005:i:02:p:225-243_05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.