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Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court

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  • McGuire, Kevin T.
  • Caldeira, Gregory A.

Abstract

Each year thousands of cases and litigants come to the Supreme Court. How can the Court find the most important cases to decide? The law of obscenity illustrates particularly well the Court's problem as it constructs its plenary agenda. Using data drawn from petitions for certiorari and jurisdictional statements filed with the Supreme Court from 1955 to 1987, we formulate and test a model of case selection in which professional obscenity lawyers and organized interests figure as critical elements in the process of agenda building. We also encounter strong evidence of the Court's differential treatment of several different litigants. Moreover, the calculus of selection changed markedly over time, as the Court itself changed; the Burger Court and Warren Court weighed several of the criteria quite differently.

Suggested Citation

  • McGuire, Kevin T. & Caldeira, Gregory A., 1993. "Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 717-726, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:03:p:717-726_10
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    Cited by:

    1. John M. de Figueiredo, 2009. "Integrated Political Strategy," NBER Working Papers 15053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. De Figueiredo, John M. & De Figueiredo, Rui J. P. Jr., 2002. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation," Working papers 4247-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    3. Jeff Yates & Damon M. Cann & Brent D. Boyea, 2013. "Judicial Ideology and the Selection of Disputes for U.S. Supreme Court Adjudication," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(4), pages 847-865, December.
    4. Maxwell Mak & Andrew H. Sidman & Udi Sommer, 2013. "Is Certiorari Contingent on Litigant Behavior? Petitioners' Role in Strategic Auditing," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(1), pages 54-75, March.
    5. Ganghof, Steffen & Manow, Philip, 2005. "Mechanismen der Politik: Strategische Interaktion im deutschen Regierungssystem," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 54, number 54.

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