IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v86y1992i03p612-625_09.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Presidency and Organized Interests: White House Patterns of Interest Group Liaison

Author

Listed:
  • Peterson, Mark A.

Abstract

Studies of the relationship between the presidency and organized interests generally focus on presidential assistants and their communications with the interest group community. I take a different perspective. Based on presidential strategic interests and choices illuminated for several administrations through interviews with White House officials, four kinds of interest group liaison are identified: governing party, consensus building, outreach, and legitimization. These approaches are then empirically evaluated for the Reagan White House using interviews with Reagan's staff and the responses of several hundred interest group leaders to 1980 and 1985 surveys of national voluntary associations. Like the Carter administration after its first year, the Reagan White House initially emphasized “liaison as governing party†built on exclusive and programmatic ties to groups. A less activist legislative agenda and new circumstances later shifted the emphasis of the Reagan and Bush administrations to other forms of interest group liaison.

Suggested Citation

  • Peterson, Mark A., 1992. "The Presidency and Organized Interests: White House Patterns of Interest Group Liaison," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(3), pages 612-625, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:86:y:1992:i:03:p:612-625_09
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S000305540009016X/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Daniel P. Carpenter & Kevin M. Esterling & David M. J. Lazer, 1998. "The Strength of Weak Ties in Lobbying Networks," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(4), pages 417-444, October.
    2. Klingler, Jonathan, 2014. "Political Capital in the 21st Century: An Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private," IAST Working Papers 15-19, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:86:y:1992:i:03:p:612-625_09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.