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Change and Stability in Superpower Rivalry

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  • McGinnis, Michael D.
  • Williams, John T.

Abstract

We investigate the dynamics of superpower rivalry. Participants in policy debates within each state use information about expected future threats and economic costs to influence other policy actors, and this process of sophisticated reaction links the security policies of these two states into a single rivalry system. Analysis of vector autoregression models of U.S. and Soviet military expenditures and diplomatic hostility and U.S. gross national product supports the hypothesis that these policies approximate the behavior of unitary rational states capable of forming rational expectations of each other's future behavior. The dynamic response of this system to a wide range of exogenous shocks (or innovations) reveals the underlying stability of this rivalry system. The military expenditures of both states exhibit a cyclical response to innovations, with a shorter U.S. cycle. This lack of synchronization creates several problems for analysis and for policy change.

Suggested Citation

  • McGinnis, Michael D. & Williams, John T., 1989. "Change and Stability in Superpower Rivalry," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1101-1123, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1101-1123_08
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffrey W. Knopf, 1998. "How Rational Is “The Rational Public†?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(5), pages 544-571, October.
    2. Jong Hee Park, 2010. "Structural Change in U.S. Presidents' Use of Force," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 766-782, July.
    3. Koos van Wyk & Sarah Radloff, 1993. "Symmetry and Reciprocity in South Africa's Foreign Policy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(2), pages 382-396, June.
    4. T. Clifton Morgan & Glenn Palmer, 2000. "A Model of Foreign Policy Substitutability," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(1), pages 11-32, February.
    5. William R. Thompson, 1995. "Principal Rivalries," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(2), pages 195-223, June.
    6. Michael D. McGinnis, 1991. "Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(3), pages 443-473, September.
    7. Michael D. Ward & Sheen Rajmaira, 1992. "Reciprocity and Norms in U.S.-Soviet Foreign Policy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(2), pages 342-368, June.
    8. Glenn Palmer & Archana Bhandari, 2000. "The Investigation of Substitutability in Foreign Policy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(1), pages 3-10, February.
    9. Patrick J. Haney & Roberta Q. Herzberg & Rick K. Wilson, 1992. "Advice and Consent," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(4), pages 603-633, December.
    10. Dean Hoover & David Kowalewski, 1992. "Dynamic Models of Dissent and Repression," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(1), pages 150-182, March.
    11. John T. Williams & Michael D. McGinnis, 1992. "The Dimension of Superpower Rivalry," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(1), pages 86-118, March.
    12. Will H. Moore, 1995. "Action-Reaction or Rational Expectations?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(1), pages 129-167, March.

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