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Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation

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  • Powell, Robert

Abstract

Recent formal work in nuclear deterrence theory has focused on brinkmanship crises in which states exert coercive pressure by manipulating the risk of an unlimited nuclear exchange. This essay extends the formal analysis of deterrence theory to the strategy of limited retaliation in which states exert coercive pressure by inflicting limited amounts of damage in order to make the threat of future punishment more credible. This strategy is modeled as a game of sequential bargaining with incomplete information. The equilibria suggest that states prefer relatively smaller, less-destructive limited options; that counterforce options are desirable even if they cannot limit the total amount of damage an adversary can inflict; that smaller, less-destructive limited nuclear options may make a nuclear exchange more likely; and that uncertainty and incomplete information may significantly enhance deterrence.

Suggested Citation

  • Powell, Robert, 1989. "Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(2), pages 503-519, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:02:p:503-519_08
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    Cited by:

    1. Nakao, Keisuke, 2019. "Moving Forward vs. Inflicting Costs in a Random-Walk Model of War," MPRA Paper 96071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Paul K. Huth, 1990. "The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(2), pages 270-290, June.
    3. Keisuke Iida, 1993. "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 403-426, September.
    4. David Carment & Dane Rowlands, 1998. "Three's Company," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(5), pages 572-599, October.
    5. Erik Gartzke & Matthew Kroenig, 2017. "Social Scientific Analysis of Nuclear Weapons," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(9), pages 1853-1874, October.
    6. Keisuke Nakao, 2022. "Denial and punishment in war," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(2), pages 166-179, March.
    7. Lisa J. Carlson, 1995. "A Theory of Escalation And International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(3), pages 511-534, September.
    8. Michael D. McGinnis, 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: I," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 443-457, October.

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