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A Comparative Analysis of Senate-House Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy, 1953–1964

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  • Clausen, Aage R.
  • Cheney, Richard B.

Abstract

The manifest purpose of the roll call analysis described in this paper is that of demonstrating the existence of two policy dimensions in Congressional voting: economic and welfare. Support is sought for two propositions:I. Each of the two dimensions appears in both the House and the Senate in each of six Congresses, the 83rd through the 88th, 1953–1964;II. Roll call voting on the economic policy dimension is more heavily influenced by partisan differences while welfare policy voting is more subject to constituency constraints.The second proposition is significant as an attempt to distinguish between a policy dimension on which partisan differences appear to be responsible for the greater part of the voting variation, and a policy dimension on which constituency factors have a substantial impact. This bears upon the more general concern with distinguishing those party differences in voting behavior which are a function of an independent partisan factor from those which may be attributed to any number of factors correlated with partisan affiliation. This problem will be viewed from different analytic perspectives, including an analysis of the effects of intra-party and inter-party personnel turnover on the policy positions taken by representatives of the same constituency.

Suggested Citation

  • Clausen, Aage R. & Cheney, Richard B., 1970. "A Comparative Analysis of Senate-House Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy, 1953–1964," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 138-152, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:64:y:1970:i:01:p:138-152_12
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    1. Brian Baugus & Feler Bose & Jeffry Jacob, 2021. "Get in line: Do part‐time legislatures use sunset laws to keep executive agencies in check," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(1), pages 185-199, January.

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