“Government,†“Law,†and the Separation of Powers

The continued growth of administrative agencies exercising legislative and judicial (or, if one prefers, “quasi-legislative†and “quasi-judicial†) powers furnishes a constant inducement to reevaluate the separation of powers theory. In a general way, the theory is admittedly hostile to this development as involving an inordinate concentration of power in the executive. Accordingly, we are presented with the problem of whether governmental practice should be accomodated to the theory or the theory revised to fit practice.Of course the pressure of circumstance has already made a considerable impression on doctrinal exposition. Thus it is not seriously contended that the delegation of any rule-making power to administrative agencies is necessarily a delegation of legislative power within the meaning of the doctrine. Nor is it seriously contended that the right of such agencies to conduct a trial and come to a formal judgment thereupon is necessarily a delegation of judicial power—again within the meaning of the doctrine.