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Threats and Commitments: International Tribunals and Domestic Trials in Peace Negotiations

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  • BATES, GENEVIEVE

Abstract

Does International Criminal Court (ICC) involvement affect the agreements parties to a civil conflict make, especially regarding matters of accountability? In this article, I argue that the ICC places a unique pressure on domestic elites negotiating peace in the wake of political violence. To avoid going to trial in the international arena, elites facing the threat of punishment have an incentive to agree to implement some form of domestic accountability, showing the Court that they can handle their own business. I evaluate my argument using data on the content of peace agreements negotiated between 2002 and 2019. I find that ICC involvement increases the probability that negotiators commit to accountability during peace processes. To explore potential mechanisms and more explicitly evaluate alternative explanations, I draw on case studies from Colombia and Sudan.

Suggested Citation

  • Bates, Genevieve, 2026. "Threats and Commitments: International Tribunals and Domestic Trials in Peace Negotiations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 120(3), pages -9, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:120:y:2026:i:3:p:_9
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