The Concepts of Representation

In this reply to Jane Mansbridge's “Clarifying the Concept of Representation†in this issue (American Political Science Review 2011). I argue that our main disagreements are conceptual, and are traceable to the attempt to treat the concept of representation as a “single highly complex concept†as Hanna Pitkin once put it. Instead, I argue, it would be more useful to develop the various concepts that emphasize the underlying forms of representation. Against the view that empirical regularity should guide concept formation, I suggest that the failure to find instances of the cases I conceptualize is not itself a reason to reject them. Instead, I argue in favor of concepts that emphasize one side or other of a relationship, rather than treating both sides simultaneously, defending the view that “promissory†and “anticipatory†may usefully describe the activity of “representing†but ought to emphasize only one side of the representative–voter relationship. I also explain why adding substantive accounts of representation to any of Mansbridge's modifying concepts dilutes their practical value. I conclude by indicating the importance of developing concepts that stretch beyond the democratic contexts that feature prominently in her response.