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Coercion and (Global) Justice

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  • VALENTINI, LAURA

Abstract

In this article, I develop a new account of the liberal view that principles of justice (in general) are meant to justify state coercion, and consider its implications for the question of global socioeconomic justice (in particular). Although contemporary proponents of this view deny that principles of socioeconomic justice apply globally, on my newly developed account this conclusion is mistaken. I distinguish between two types of coercion, systemic and interactional, and argue that a plausible theory of global justice should contain principles justifying both. The justification of interactional coercion requires principles regulating interstate interference; that of systemic coercion requires principles of global socioeconomic justice. I argue that the proposed view not only helps us make progress in the debate on global justice, but also offers an independently compelling and systematic account of the function and conditions of applicability of justice.

Suggested Citation

  • Valentini, Laura, 2011. "Coercion and (Global) Justice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 205-220, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:105:y:2011:i:01:p:205-220_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Klaudijo Klaser, 2020. "A Theory of Justice of John Rawls as Basis for European Fiscal Union," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 11(1-2).
    2. Klaudijo Klaser, 2018. "The European Social Welfare Function Shaped on a Difference Principle: A Normative Rawlsian Approach in Favour of Fiscal Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 7186, CESifo.

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