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Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan

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  • PEKKANEN, ROBERT
  • NYBLADE, BENJAMIN
  • KRAUSS, ELLIS S.

Abstract

How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a “best loser†or “zombie†provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

Suggested Citation

  • Pekkanen, Robert & Nyblade, Benjamin & Krauss, Ellis S., 2006. "Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(2), pages 183-193, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:100:y:2006:i:02:p:183-193_06
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    Cited by:

    1. Ulubasoglu, Mehmet Ali & Yaraşır-Tülümce, Sevinç, 2019. "Pork and Turkey: Distributive Politics in the Allocation of Public Investments into Turkish Electoral Districts 1987–2004," MPRA Paper 96842, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Megumi Naoi & Ellis Krauss, 2009. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 874-892, October.
    3. Yamamura, Eiji & Sabatini, Fabio, 2015. "The impact of the media on voters’ attitude toward Junichiro Koizumi and his policy," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34, pages 24-32.
    4. Annika Hennl, 2014. "Intra-party dynamics in mixed-member electoral systems: How strategies of candidate selection impact parliamentary behaviour," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(1), pages 93-116, January.

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