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Determinismo económico de las conductas: una aproximación a su complejidad


  • Manel Antelo

    (Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Santiago de Compostela, Campus Norte, s/n, 15782 Santiago de Compostela, Spain)


Using a two-period tax-signalling model, a study is performed on the behaviour of a revenue-raising government in setting profit-based corporate taxes for a company with private information on its potential profitability. In a separating equilibrium in which both the high- and low-profit company produce a positive amount in period 1 (separating equilibrium S2), the tax set for that period is lower than that of the symmetric information, resulting in informational rent to the high-profit company in that period, but not in period 2. As result, taxes increase with time. In a separating equilibrium in which only the high-profit company produces (separating equilibrium S1 or shut-down equilibrium), no informational rent goes to the high-profit company in either period, but at the cost that the low-profit firm exits the market. Finally, in a pooling equilibrium, taxes are time-invariant and charged in such a way that period-1 informational rent to the high-profit company is lower than in S2, but persists in period 2. Consequently, the government can maximize tax revenue by not forcing information disclosure. The impact of government behaviour on welfare is also examined.

Suggested Citation

  • Manel Antelo, 2016. "Determinismo económico de las conductas: una aproximación a su complejidad," Cuadernos de Economía - Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, Asociación Cuadernos de Economía, vol. 39(110), pages 76-86, Mayo.
  • Handle: RePEc:cud:journl:v:39:y:2016:i:110:p:76-86

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    Corporate taxes; Signalling; Revenue-raising government; Separating equilibrium; Pooling equilibrium; Welfare;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design


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