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Containing banking panics under tbe National Banking System: Discretion versus coordination


  • Laurent LE MAUX


Elmus Wicker draws a picture of banking panics under the National Banking System (NBS). He considers that the New York Clearing House (NYCH) was responsible for the aggravation of banking crises because of its incapacity to coordonnate banks and to equalize their reserves. A description of the structural characteristics of the NBS challenges this thesis. Moreover, a theory of the high-poweredmoney help to show why equalization of reserves is overwhelmed by NYCH loan certificates issuance. Our demonstration leads to a controversy, actually the opposition between discretion and coordination, and to the idea that the discretion logic excludes coordination log

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent LE MAUX, 2003. "Containing banking panics under tbe National Banking System: Discretion versus coordination," Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy, L'Harmattan, issue 45, pages 139-160.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpo:journl:y:2003:i:45:p:139-160

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    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • N11 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913


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