The Interacting Politics of Agricultural Input Subsidies and Cash Transfers in Malawi and Zambia

The influence of international donors in the policymaking of social protection (SP) in Sub-Saharan Africa has been a hot topic of debate since the early 2000s. Recent studies differ in perspective on whether donors’ influence is limited to soft power, or whether the use of hard power is more dominant. This article investigates the relative policy power of domestic elites and international donors, by comparing recent SP reforms in Malawi and Zambia. The cases show divergent reforms, in which Malawi’s SP programs are overall stagnating, while Zambia’s are expanding. The article innovates by jointly analyzing the politics underpinning the two most dominant instruments of SP in both countries: agricultural input subsidies and social cash transfers. While most studies examine them in isolation, a joint analysis underscores the ways in which the programs are embroiled in ongoing political competition, on the ideological, electoral, and clientelist levels, often pitting international donors against domestic elites. Based on original qualitative data (2023–2024), the article makes three arguments. First, recent economic crises enhanced donor hard power via International Monetary Fund and World Bank loan conditions, compelling both governments to reform. Second, donors exercise soft power in tandem, tailoring reform strategies to national contexts. Third, long-term trajectories of SP institutionalization diverge: Zambia shows increasing institutionalization, while Malawi’s remains static and limited. These trajectories are rooted in structural differences and reinforced by path dependency. The findings contribute to broader debates on the political economy of donor influence and the future of SP in the Global South.