Asymmetrical Decentralization and Constitutional Accommodation in Cameroon: Assessing the Special Status of the Anglophone Regions

Aim: This article examines whether Cameroon’s constitutional framework provides a coherent and sustainable basis for asymmetrical decentralization through the special status granted to the North-West and South-West Regions. It situates this arrangement within Cameroon’s constitutional identity as a decentralized unitary State and explores the legal space available for territorial differentiation under Articles 1(2), 61, 62(2), and 64 of the Constitution, as well as the minority-protection provisions of the Preamble and Article 65. Method: The study adopts a doctrinal and comparative constitutional approach based on constitutional texts analysis, institutional assessment, and relevant comparative literature on asymmetrical decentralization and territorial accommodation. The analysis draws on constitutional provisions, decentralization laws, and comparative constitutional scholarship on territorial governance. Results: The study demonstrates that Cameroonian constitutional law simultaneously authorizes and constrains territorial asymmetry. While the Constitution permits the consideration of regional “specificities,” it subjects such differentiation to strict requirements of unity, territorial integrity, and national cohesion. The effectiveness of the special status depends less on its formal designation than on its normative discipline, institutional guarantees, and perceived legitimacy among local populations. In practice, asymmetry remains fragile when mediated primarily through ordinary legislation and administrative discretion, exposing it to political reversibility and symbolic implementation. Conversely, when embedded within clear constitutional standards, stabilized through legal safeguards, and reinforced by democratic accountability and operational bilingualism, asymmetrical decentralization can function as a genuine mechanism of constitutional accommodation. Conclusion: The study suggests the potential development of an African doctrine of “unity-compatible asymmetry,” capable of reconciling diversity management with constitutional cohesion in plural societies. Recommendation: The article recommends stronger constitutional safeguards, enhanced judicial oversight and participatory regional governance mechanisms to strengthen the credibility of asymmetrical decentralisation.