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Informational externalities with lump-sum sampling


  • Carole Haritchabalet
  • Régis Renault


We consider a game of strategic experimentation where agents are restricted to an all-or-nothing sampling strategy. The strategic interaction between agents due to informational externalities is affected by the sizes of the experimentation samples and the sensitivity of information to changes in sample sizes. There is experimentation only if the overall sample is large enough. Equilibrium may involve optimal, insufficient or excessive experimentation relative to a second-best welfare benchmark. This unusual over-experimentation result is associated not necessarily with large samples but with a low elasticity of the value of information with respect to the sample size.

Suggested Citation

  • Carole Haritchabalet & Régis Renault, 2006. "Informational externalities with lump-sum sampling," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 1005-1022, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:39:y:2006:i:3:p:1005-1022

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Hansen, Wendy L & Prusa, Thomas J, 1996. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts Is Greater Than the Whole," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 746-769, October.
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    3. Benjamin Liebman, 2004. "ITC voting behavior on sunset reviews," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 140(3), pages 446-475, September.
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    6. Bruce A. Blonigen, 2005. "The Effects of," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 19(3), pages 407-424.
    7. Moore, Michael O., 2005. ""Facts available" dumping allegations: when will foreign firms cooperate in antidumping petitions?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 185-204, March.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods


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