Risk sharing in a federation with population mobility and long horizons
In this paper risk sharing among individuals within and across regions in a federation with population mobility and infinite horizons is considered. It is shown that the regional authorities will not fully exploit gains from interregional risk sharing when population mobility is imperfect. In the Nash equilibrium there is complete risk sharing among the individuals within each region, however, which corresponds to the policies of the central authority. Regional authorities who care about their reputation may be able to commit to an efficient allocation. It is possible that improvements in the degree of mobility will make such commitments likely.
Volume (Year): 33 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://economics.ca/en/membership.php Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:33:y:2000:i:3:p:662-676. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.