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Trade Policy with Risky Investment in Quality

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  • Anthony Creane

Abstract

Consider a new export market in which firms can invest in quality but may fail to achieve quality. Quality of the export good, then, varies across firms, having endogenous (whether to invest) and exogenous (determined by nature) aspects. Previous works suggest that the market outcome and socially optimal policy depend on whether quality is exogenous or endogenous. It is shown that the previous differences are driven by the demand and cost parameterizations, not by the endogeneity of quality. Previous works also suggest subsidies to raise welfare. Subsidies are found to lower welfare while a tax may raise welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony Creane, 1999. "Trade Policy with Risky Investment in Quality," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(1), pages 39-54, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:32:y:1999:i:1:p:39-54
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    Cited by:

    1. Raff, Horst & Kim, Young-Han, 1999. "Optimal export policy in the presence of informational barriers to entry and imperfect competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 99-123, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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