IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v31y1998i2p247-278.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Unemployment Insurance and Job Durations: Seasonal and Non-Seasonal Jobs

Author

Listed:
  • David A. Green
  • Timothy Sargent

Abstract

The authors use regional and individual variation in unemployment insurance (UI) parameters to estimate the impact of UI incentives on job durations. In doing so, they distinguish between seasonal and nonseasonal jobs. The authors find evidence of substantial tailoring of job durations to UI incentives in seasonal but not in nonseasonal jobs. Even for seasonal jobs, adjusting UI parameters has small impacts on average job duration except in high unemployment regions. Increasing the UI entrance requirement leads to some job lengthening but also to the creation of more very short jobs.

Suggested Citation

  • David A. Green & Timothy Sargent, 1998. "Unemployment Insurance and Job Durations: Seasonal and Non-Seasonal Jobs," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(2), pages 247-278, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:31:y:1998:i:2:p:247-278
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28199805%2931%3A2%3C247%3AUIAJDS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E
    Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ambler, Steven & Cardia, Emanuela & Phaneuf, Louis, 1992. "Contrats de salaire, croissance endogène et fluctuations," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 68(1), pages 175-204, mars et j.
    2. Ambler, Steve & Paquet, Alain, 1996. "Fiscal spending shocks, endogenous government spending, and real business cycles," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-3), pages 237-256.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gutierrez, Italo A., 2016. "Job insecurity, unemployment insurance and on-the-job search. Evidence from older American workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 228-245.
    2. David M. Gray, 2006. "Recent Changes to the Employment Insurance Regime: Encouraging Work On-claim and Off-claim," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 32(1), pages 99-110, March.
    3. Matthew Webb & Arthur Sweetman & Casey Warman, 2014. "How Targeted is Targeted Tax Relief? Evidence from the Unemployment Insurance Youth Hires Program," Working Papers 1298, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    4. Andreas Hornstein & Mingwei Yuan, 1999. "Can a Matching Model Explain the Long-Run Increase in Canada's Unemployment Rate?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 878-905, August.
    5. Baguelin, Olivier & Remillon, Delphine, 2014. "Unemployment insurance and management of the older workforce in a dual labor market: Evidence from France," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 245-264.
    6. Konstantinos Tatsiramos & Jan C. Ours, 2014. "Labor Market Effects Of Unemployment Insurance Design," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 284-311, April.
    7. Matthew D. Webb & Arthur Sweetman & Casey Warman, 2016. "Targeting Tax Relief at Youth Employment," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 42(4), pages 415-430, December.
    8. Rafael Lalive & Jan Ours & Josef Zweimüller, 2011. "Equilibrium unemployment and the duration of unemployment benefits," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 24(4), pages 1385-1409, October.
    9. D. G. C. Britto, 2016. "Unemployment Insurance and the Duration of Employment: Evidence from a Regression Kink Design," Working Papers wp1058, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    10. Hägglund, Pathric, 2000. "Effects of changes in the unemployment insurance eligibility requirements on job duration - Swedish evidence," Working Paper Series 2000:4, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    11. Pedro S. Martins, 2015. "Working to get fired? Regression discontinuity effects of unemployment benefit eligibility on prior employment duration," Working Papers 61, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.
    12. Hägglund, Pathric, 2007. "Effects of Changes in the Unemployment Insurance Eligibility Requirements on Job Duration - Swedish Evidence," Working Paper Series 3/2007, Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
    13. Kapsalis, Constantine, 2000. "The Impact of Bill C-12 on New Entrants and Re-Entrants," MPRA Paper 26137, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Kuhn, Peter J. & Riddell, Chris, 2006. "The Long-Term Effects of a Generous Income Support Program: Unemployment Insurance in New Brunswick and Maine, 1940-1991," IZA Discussion Papers 1919, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    15. Rebollo-Sanz, Yolanda, 2012. "Unemployment insurance and job turnover in Spain," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 403-426.
    16. van Ours, J.C. & Tuit, S., 2010. "How Changes in Unemployment Benefit Duration Affect the Inflow Into Unemployment," Discussion Paper 2010-07, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    17. Lalive, R. & van Ours, J.C. & Zweimüller, J., 2006. "How Changes in Potential Benefit Duration Affect Equilibrium Unemployment," Discussion Paper 2006-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    18. Diogo Britto, 2016. "Unemployment Insurance and the Duration of Employment: Theory and Evidence from a Regression Kink Design," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def048, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:31:y:1998:i:2:p:247-278. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.