Asymmetric Information, Credit Rationing, and Economic Growth
This paper shows that asymmetric information in capital goods development can enhance long-run economic growth. This growth-enhancing role occurs when new capital goods are highly productive and high-quality new capital goods are not much more expensive to develop than low-quality capital goods. Under these conditions, asymmetric information induces agents to take high-risk projects whose success creates faster evolution of knowledge and faster economic growth. The popular view that asymmetric information and its induced credit rationing reduce growth can be supported under complementary conditions.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 29 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4|
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://economics.ca/en/membership.php Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:29:y:1996:i:3:p:665-87. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.