World Integration, Competitive and Bargaining-Regime Switch: An Exploration
The author considers two trading blocs that can engage in a free trade or a bargaining-dictated trade. Output is produced by several technologies that offer different substitutability between domestic and foreign inputs. Capital is allocated between the various technologies prior to the resolution of uncertainty. The switch to the bargaining equilibrium is shown to diversify country-specific supply shocks. If the bargaining costs are small, trade dependency and bargaining are exploited to allow for the diversification of national shocks. If the bargaining costs are large, countries will invest in trade-independent technologies and the incidence of bargaining will be minimized.
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Volume (Year): 27 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alvin E Roth, 2008. "Axiomatic Models of Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002376, David K. Levine.
- Ethier, Wilfred J, 1982. "National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of International Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 389-405, June.
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- R. Dornbusch, 1984.
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- Rudiger Dornbusch, 1984. "External Debt, Budget Deficits and Disequilibrium Exchange Rates," NBER Working Papers 1336, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ronald W. Jones & Douglas D. Purvis, 1981. "International Differences in Response to Common External Shocks: The Role of Purchasing Power Parity," Working Papers 419, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309, April.
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