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Credit rationing, government credit programs and co-financing



Costly monitoring may lead to credit rationing in equilibrium in an economy without any adverse selection or moral hazard problems. Given the widespread phenomenon of government intervention in credit markets in developing and developed countries, the natural question then is, How effective are these government programs? I incorporate government loan programs in a simple, closed, pure exchange economy with borrowing and lending. Intermediation of funds is facilitated in credit markets characterized by a costly state verification problem. I then show that government loan programs (financed with lump-sum taxes) with co-financing can increase credit rationing when the private lender is the prior claimant in the event of a default. Moreover such programs unambiguously decrease the expected utility of both borrowers and lenders. On the other hand, when the government is the prior claimant, such programs decrease credit rationing and increase the expected utility of borrowers. Finally, with proportional repayments there is no effect on credit rationing or expected utility of agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Dona Rai, 2007. "Credit rationing, government credit programs and co-financing," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 10, pages 361-389, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:10:y:2007:n:2:p:361-389

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    credit rationing; co-financing; lenders; borrowers; prior claimant;

    JEL classification:

    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation


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