IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sovereign debt crisis in Monetary Unions: prevention, prevention and prevention


  • Xavier Debrun


This paper draws on recent events in the euro area to discuss the serious gaps in the fiscal architecture of the European Economic and Monetary Union. These gaps stem from the lack of a fiscal federation and the incapacity of EU institutions to effectively enforce the set of rules supposed to make up for the absence of a fiscal principal. The failure of preventive instruments made the absence of crisis management and resolution capabilities in the euro area highly problematic, exposing the union to a meaningful risk of breakup. To conclude, we draw the lessons of the euro sovereign debt crisis in terms of improving the euro area’s fiscal architecture and, more broadly the fiscal framework required for the sustainability of other monetary unions without fiscal unions. JEL codes: E61, E62, F55

Suggested Citation

  • Xavier Debrun, 2010. "Sovereign debt crisis in Monetary Unions: prevention, prevention and prevention," Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(4), pages 59-69.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:rpvedb:rpve_494_0059

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: free

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: free

    More about this item


    European Monetary Union; sovereign debt; fiscal rules;

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:rpvedb:rpve_494_0059. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.