IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Remises de fidélité et abus d'éviction : quelles évolutions dans la pratique décisionnelle de la Commission européenne ?


  • Frédéric Marty
  • Julien Pillot


On February 2009, the European Commission disclosed new guidance relative to its enforcement priority in cases of abusive exclusionary conducts by dominant firms. Fidelity rebates are amongst those anticompetitive strategies. As for exclusive dealing practices, this very specific form of abuse is a much debated question both through the Commission's decisions and the European Court of Justice Judgments. Hence, the legal approach held by European competition agencies regarding loyalty rebates is often criticized as being formal rather than based on concrete economic effects. In this respect, one could ponder if the European Commission decision in "Intel" truly attests a shift towards a more economic approach. Consequently, the aim of this article is twofold: providing an economic analysis of private strategies involving fidelity rebates and discussing both the requirements and the consequences of the implementation of an effect-based approach, specifically with regard to abuse of dominance cases under article 102.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Marty & Julien Pillot, 2011. "Remises de fidélité et abus d'éviction : quelles évolutions dans la pratique décisionnelle de la Commission européenne ?," Revue internationale de droit économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(3), pages 379-404.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:riddbu:ride_253_0379

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: free

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: free

    Other versions of this item:


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:riddbu:ride_253_0379. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.