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Remises de fidélité et abus d'éviction : quelles évolutions dans la pratique décisionnelle de la Commission européenne ?

Listed author(s):
  • Frédéric Marty
  • Julien Pillot

On February 2009, the European Commission disclosed new guidance relative to its enforcement priority in cases of abusive exclusionary conducts by dominant firms. Fidelity rebates are amongst those anticompetitive strategies. As for exclusive dealing practices, this very specific form of abuse is a much debated question both through the Commission's decisions and the European Court of Justice Judgments. Hence, the legal approach held by European competition agencies regarding loyalty rebates is often criticized as being formal rather than based on concrete economic effects. In this respect, one could ponder if the European Commission decision in "Intel" truly attests a shift towards a more economic approach. Consequently, the aim of this article is twofold: providing an economic analysis of private strategies involving fidelity rebates and discussing both the requirements and the consequences of the implementation of an effect-based approach, specifically with regard to abuse of dominance cases under article 102.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Article provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Revue internationale de droit économique.

Volume (Year): t.XXV (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 379-404

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Handle: RePEc:cai:riddbu:ride_253_0379
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