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Dynamique de l’action collective, taille du groupe et degré de rivalité de la rente

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  • Guillaume Cheikbossian

Abstract

In this paper, we study the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking in order to challenge the position of an incumbent for the award of a rent. Specifically, we consider a repeated game in which group members use Nash reversion strategies to support cooperative behavior within the group. In addition, the rent underlying the conflict has a varying mix of public and private characteristics between a public (non-divisible) good and a private (divisible) good. We then show that cooperation within the group is more difficult to sustain as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the degree of rivalry of the rent increases. However, the larger the size of the community, the more its members are able to support within-group cooperation no matter how private (or public) the rent.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2015. "Dynamique de l’action collective, taille du groupe et degré de rivalité de la rente," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 125(1), pages 145-169.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_251_0145
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