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Insiders, Outsiders et le recrutement syndical

Listed author(s):
  • Michel Paul
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    Trade union objectives are analysed in the literature by means of two canonical approaches, the median voter theorem and the membership maximization hypothesis, that are thought to be contradictories. The paper aims to show this assertion is misleading in the insider-outsider framework. To state this point, we propose a modified version of the Booth & Chatterji [1995] model in which membership is not compulsory by differentiating labour suppliers depending on whether they are employed or unemployed at the time of the bargain and we study a wage-offers game in which two organizations recruit with the workers by competing with the quality of the union goods. The main result is that the insiders? claim, unless the pool experiences some massive unemployment, is implemented at the equilibrium.

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    Article provided by Dalloz in its journal Revue d'économie politique.

    Volume (Year): 122 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 89-112

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    Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_217_0089
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