IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

The twelve principles of incentive pay

Listed author(s):
  • Marcel Boyer

In general, incentive pay is not desirable for two main reasons: it puts the worker or employee at risk of fluctuations in his/her wages and it is costly to run. Incentive pay may be explained and justified by four phenomena, which may have important effects on the net benefits of an organization: moral hazard, adverse selection, the need to induce profitable cooperation in organizations, the need to counteract costly or unproductive institutional and/or regulatory constraints. Incentive pay systems should be distinguished from variable pay designed as a risk sharing agreement as such variable pay systems need not be an incentive pay system. Incentive pay should be understood as compensation schemes which create congruence within an organization: incentive pay can contribute to ensuring that the pursuit of individual objectives or interests is canalized towards the achievement of the organization’s goals and objectives. The currently designed compensation formulas may not be the best or optimal ones to achieve the goals set for the organization: hence the need to recall the twelve basic principles.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: free

File URL:
Download Restriction: free

Article provided by Dalloz in its journal Revue d'économie politique.

Volume (Year): 121 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 285-306

in new window

Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_213_0285
Contact details of provider: Web page:

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_213_0285. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.