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Méthodes de Privatisation des Entreprises Publiques en Afrique Sub-Saharienne : une analyse théorique

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  • Mathurin Founanou

Abstract

In this article, we analyze the process of privatization of state-owned enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa. When the possible investors are not able to finance with their own funds the acquisition of public companies, the financing by the State-seller is a method relevant taking into account the objectives and constraints of the situation in Africa. We propose a particularly method of privatization via auctions, where potentials investors submits a bid with equity shares and debt shares. In this case, the government has two objectives : maximization of revenue and maximization of the efficiency. We show that the properties of this method of privatization rest mainly on the shares debt/equity. The revenue maximization is contraditory to efficiency objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Mathurin Founanou, 2009. "Méthodes de Privatisation des Entreprises Publiques en Afrique Sub-Saharienne : une analyse théorique," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 119(6), pages 921-943.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_196_0921
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