L'Ambiguïté en Économie Politique
This paper investigates the concept of strategic ambiguity conceived as candidates? intentional communicational behaviour in an electoral process. Strategic ambiguity has two distinct meanings in political economics : first, it may refer to ambivalence which is formalised by using lotteries and mixed strategies, second, to dissimulation which is formalised with intervals. We analyse these conceptions and discuss conditions under which candidates rely on strategic ambiguity in equilibrium. These conditions depending on the profile of preferences of voters, we focus on others underlying motivations a candidate has to resort to ambiguity. We then analyse the communication process between candidates and voters as games of imperfect information. We thus highlight origins of a preference for ambiguity both by candidates or voters.
Volume (Year): 119 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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