La phase III du système communautaire d'échange de quotas d'émission : Comment attribuer les permis ?
The European commission’s proposal on the EU-ETS states that auctioning will be the main method for the allocation of E. U. allowances. This article compares auctioning of carbon permit pollution with grandfathering and analyzes different auction rules in the context of multi-unit demands to allocate permits. As there is analytically no clear ranking of the procedures, experimental studies can be useful. If selecting a uniform auction seems reasonable, the choice between a close and an open format should be the result of a trade-off between arguments about collusion stability and price discovery.
Volume (Year): 119 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique.htm|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_192_0165. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.