Différer l'âge de départ en retraite les effets du cumul emploi-retraite

As underlined by Gruber and Wise [1998], in many OCDE countries, social security provisions, especially defined pension plans, impose strong constraints on retirement decisions, which incite individuals to retire early. Combined with ageing, the early retirement seems to plague the financial viability of security systems. In response, governments such as France, Italy and Sweden have established pension reforms in order to encourage agents to work longer. Major recent studies on retirement often argue that additional pensions should be paid to individuals who work longer. Pension health then increases with continued work and compensates the worker for the lower life expectancy in case he postpones retirement. While there may be good reasons for such strategy, the economic consequences of this reform are not well understood. In this respect, this papers aims to better understand the effects of alternative pensions reforms on individuals?retirement decision and financial equilibrium of PAYG system. Our analysis yields strong argument in favor of a policy aimed at eliminating the explicit tax on continued work: decreasing the contribution rate for the elder workers can not only encourages individuals to delay retirement but also helps finance the expected deficit of PAYG system. Furthermore, this paper reveals that implementing incentives schemes should be accompanied by measures to increase job opportunities, including the elimination of measures and practices that impose strong limits on activity of older worker. This is particulary true for restrictions on combining receipt of pension and work income.