Nantissement des brevets et croissance des innovations
The effect of the imperfection of collateral assignments of patents on the growth of innovations and the equilibrium interest rate is studied in this paper. It leads to the following results: security interests in patents leverage the growth of innovations and the effect of a reduction of the imperfection of collateral assignments has a marked effect on the growth of innovations only for relatively high growth rate with a relatively large gap between the equilibrium interest rate and the marginal rent on innovation. Negative side effects of the collateral assignments of patents are then discussed.
Volume (Year): 116 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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