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Les justifications des notions d'équilibre de jeux


  • Bernard Walliser


Static or dynamic equilibrium notions used in game theory may be justified along two perspectives. From an epistemic point of view, equilibria are grounded on the reasoning of hyper-intelligent players who share a common knowledge of the game structure and of their rationality. If a rationalizable equilibrium or a correlated equilibrium can easily be justified, a Nash equilibrium is only obtained under drastic conditions; as for perfect equilibrium, its justification is very sensitive to the precise assumptions made. From an evolutionnist point of view, equilibria result from the convergence of learning or evolution processes followed by boundedly rational players, however observing the past plays. A Nash equilibrium, at least in pure strategies, is often obtained as an asymptotic state and some refinements of it may even be selected; a perfect equilibrium is justified under easy conditions too. Classification JEL : C72, C73, D83

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Walliser, 2002. "Les justifications des notions d'équilibre de jeux," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 112(5), pages 693-716.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_125_0693

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    More about this item


    equilibrium; evolution; learning; game; reasoning;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness


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