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Crédit, sanctions judiciaires et sélection d'entreprises


  • Régis Blazy


We study conditions under which legal sanctions may lead to an efficient selection of heterogeneous investment projects. We consider a standard debt contract between a bank and a small firm (either profitable or not) : if financial distress occurs, an arbitration between private agreement and costly bankruptcy takes place. Before the debt repayment time, firms arbitrate between continuation and voluntary liquidation. The legislator computes a level of legal sanctions that incites good firms to continue and bad ones to liquidate: it exists provided that bankruptcy costs are not too high. Now, because legal sanctions are bound to the level of the assets shortage, the legislator’s action only leads to a second best optimum. Nevertheless, simulations show that even a moderate level of legal sanctions is sufficient for discriminating heterogeneous firms. Classification JEL : G33, D82, D21

Suggested Citation

  • Régis Blazy, 2002. "Crédit, sanctions judiciaires et sélection d'entreprises," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 112(1), pages 77-102.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_121_0077

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    More about this item


    bankruptcy; debt; bargaining; legal sanctions; law and economics; efficiency; incomplete information; entreprise;

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory


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