Salaire minimum, allocations chômage et efficacité du marché du travail. Septembre 2004 – Version finale décembre 2006
Using a simple matching model with differentiated skills, we study the effect of a minimum wage on mismatch. Introducing a minimum wage appears to improve the assignment of jobs to workers by making “bad” matches impossible. Three main results are established. First, a minimum wage increase may improve the efficiency of the labour market. Next, as soon as the minimum wage is binding (some workers do earn this minimum), unemployment benefits loose their effect on productivity, becoming invariably inefficient then. In the end, numerical simulations show that introducing a minimum wage might be more efficient than increasing unemployment benefits. JEL Classification: J64, J65.
Volume (Year): 74 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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