Épargne de précaution, éligibilité et chômage d'équilibre
In this paper, we examine the role of the size and duration of unemployment insurance on welfare in a dynamic economy with precautionary savings. We consider three instruments of economic policy: the replacement ratio, the duration of UI benefits and the eligibility conditions. We show that an increase of the duration with a reduction of the replacement ratio improve the welfare. Low replacement ratio for first months of unemployment is not costly in terms of welfare, as the eligible unemployed workers have precautionary savings to decumulate.
Volume (Year): 72 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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