Régulation multidimensionnelle d'un monopole polluant et majorité politique aléatoire
We characterize the optimal regulation contract of a monopoly with two private information parameters of adverse selection (productivity and polluting emissions levels). In this bidimensional screening framework, we introduce a political economy approach, considering that the social objective of the regulator depends on the outcome of a majority vote. Two main types of contracts appear : the first is a separating one, the second is a pooling or bunching one. Their occurrence depends on the conflict between the private and social incentives, which are the result of the regulator?s trade-o. between informational rents extraction and allocative efficiency.
Volume (Year): 71 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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