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Régulation multidimensionnelle d'un monopole polluant et majorité politique aléatoire

  • Hélène Boisson
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    We characterize the optimal regulation contract of a monopoly with two private information parameters of adverse selection (productivity and polluting emissions levels). In this bidimensional screening framework, we introduce a political economy approach, considering that the social objective of the regulator depends on the outcome of a majority vote. Two main types of contracts appear : the first is a separating one, the second is a pooling or bunching one. Their occurrence depends on the conflict between the private and social incentives, which are the result of the regulator?s trade-o. between informational rents extraction and allocative efficiency.

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    Article provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Recherches économiques de Louvain.

    Volume (Year): 71 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 285-313

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    Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_713_0285
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain.htm

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