Propriété intellectuelle et politique de concurrence. Le cas des accords de type « pay-for-delay »

This article reviews the recent literature on the so-called ?pay-for-delay agreements,? a form of patent dispute settlement agreement in which a generic manufacturer acknowledges the patent of an originator pharmaceutical company and agrees to refrain from marketing its generic product for a specific period of time. In return, the generic company receives a consideration in the form of a payment from the originator. After a presentation of the evaluation grid that is made of these agreements combining intellectual property and competition issues, we examine to which extent the use by the competition authorities of a truncated analysis based on the size of payments really helps to shed light on the most likely anti-competitive agreements or, conversely, if this is equivalent to the way a drunk uses a lamppost, namely for support rather than illumination. Classification JEL : K21, L41, 034.