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Insatisfaction à l’égard de l’impôt et séquence temporelle du prélèvement : une étude expérimentale

Author

Listed:
  • Radu Vranceanu
  • Angela Sutan
  • Delphine Dubart

Abstract

This paper reports experimental results from a linear sanction cost variant of the power-to-take game, with implications for tax collection policies. This framework allows to compare a pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) tax collection system with an ex-post tax collection system in which payroll taxes are levied at the end of the fiscal year. In the second system, taxpayers might develop a feeling of income ownership, and express higher dissatisfaction if the government appropriates a part of it. In our data, dissatisfaction with taxation, as proxied by the sanction in the power-to-take game, is significantly higher in the ex-post tax collection system compared with the PAYE system. Communication opportunities are associated with lower sanction rates, yet the communication channel is not used extensively by participants. Classification JEL : C91, H26, D01.

Suggested Citation

  • Radu Vranceanu & Angela Sutan & Delphine Dubart, 2019. "Insatisfaction à l’égard de l’impôt et séquence temporelle du prélèvement : une étude expérimentale," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 70(6), pages 1227-1240.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_706_1227
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax collection system; pay-as-you-earn; endowment effect; power-to-take game; experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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