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Common Value Auctions with Voluntary and Qualified Entry


  • Marco Casari
  • Timothy N. Cason


We study auctions under different entry rules. In the field, individuals self-select into auctions and regulations often require them to meet specific qualifications.?In this experiment we assess the role of voluntary entry and financial requirements on the incidence of severe overbidding and bankruptcies, which are widespread in common value auctions.?We show that voluntary entry amplifies overbidding and increases bankruptcy rates.?Qualified entry has only modest impacts on overbidding.?This study adds new insights to existing experiments where all subjects are usually placed exogenously into auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Casari & Timothy N. Cason, 2016. "Common Value Auctions with Voluntary and Qualified Entry," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 67(5), pages 953-976.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_675_0953

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