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Effets de réputation dans un problème de hold-up

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  • Chantal Marlats

Abstract

We consider two economic partners involved in a long-run relationship where one of them, the seller, must choose to make a specicific investment or not. Once realized, the other partner, the buyer, can expropriate a part of the surplus. This leads the buyer to not make the investment. A recent literature shows that in dynamic situations there exists an efficient equilibrium (Che et Sakoviks [2004]). We explore reputation effects by introducing asymmetric information about one of the players? type. We show that only the seller can establish a reputation. In this case he invests in a suboptimal way in all equilibria. This information asymmetry can be made arbitrarily small. This suggests that dynamic considerations may not be a robust approach for efficiency in hold up situations, at least in this setting. Classification JEL : L14, C73.

Suggested Citation

  • Chantal Marlats, 2011. "Effets de réputation dans un problème de hold-up," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 62(3), pages 557-565.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_623_0557
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    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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