Politique monétaire de la bce et inertie des taux d'intérêt. Quel rôle pour les indicateurs d'inflation nationaux ?
This paper investigates two hypotheses regarding the influence of national considerations in the ecb interest-rate setting. The first hypothesis is related to the institutional framework of the Eurosystem, with a predominance of national representatives in the ecb Governing Council. The second hypothesis is more strategic: the ecb may be careful not to push one or several countries into deflation when raising its interest rates. Those two hypotheses are tested using an augmented specification of the Taylor rule. Our results suggest that national considerations matter in the ecb decision-making, especially due to the fear of pushing individual countries toward deflation. Interestingly, inflation dispersion among emu countries also seems to provide an explanation for the high inertia in euro area interest rates. Classification JEL : E31, E52, E58.
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