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Assurance santé et sélection adverse. L'incidence des maladies invalidantes

Author

Listed:
  • David Alary
  • Franck Bien

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of chronic diseases on insurance contracts with adverse selection. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the introduction of chronic diseases influences the equilibrium of insurance market. We characterize conditions such that first best contracts can be optimal with asymmetric information. Classification JEL : D82, I1.

Suggested Citation

  • David Alary & Franck Bien, 2008. "Assurance santé et sélection adverse. L'incidence des maladies invalidantes," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 59(4), pages 737-748.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_594_0737
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6796 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Franck Bien & Arnold Chassagnon & Manuel Plisson, 2011. "Est-il rationnel de ne pas s'assurer contre la dépendance ?," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(4), pages 161-199.
    3. Plisson, Manuel, 2009. "Assurabilité et développement de l'assurance dépendance," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/5064 edited by Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé, March.
    4. Franck Bien & Arnold Chassagnon & Manuel Plisson, 2012. "Est-il rationnel de ne pas s'assurer contre la dépendance ?," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754579, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health

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