Une analyse théorique et empirique des déterminants sous-jacents dans la prise de décision
We propose in this article some new extensions of the well-known social preferences model of Fehr and Schmidt : the introduction of opponents? payoffs differences and a simple element of reciprocity. To test their robustness, we estimate fixed-effects Logit models with collected data on a three-player game with a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Results highlight a strong influence of proposed extensions that don?t display a sense of fairness but rather the self-centered concern. This new model provides a better explanation of individuals? decisions than the pioneering model of Fehr and Schmidt. Classification JEL : C25, C72, C91, D63
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