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Allocation optimale de quotas de pollution et information asymétrique

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Listed:
  • Michel Mougeot
  • Sonia Schwartz

Abstract

We consider, in this paper, the allocation of pollution quotas as a mechanism design problem. The first objective of pollution quotas is to reduce pollution, but raising revenue is an additional goal when taxation is distortionary. As there is a conflict between allocative efficiency and distributional concerns, rent extraction matters. We show that the level of pollution achieved under incomplete information is lower than under complete information. Each firm can receive more or less permits than under complete information. When the cost parameters are drawn from different probability distributions, the high abatement cost firms may be discriminated against. Classification JEL : Q2, D8, H2.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Mougeot & Sonia Schwartz, 2008. "Allocation optimale de quotas de pollution et information asymétrique," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 59(3), pages 505-515.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_593_0505
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    Cited by:

    1. Mourad Afif & Sandrine Spaeter, 2010. "Adverse Selection, Emission Permits and Optimal Price Differentiation," Working Papers of BETA 2010-07, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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