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Protection des actionnaires et bénéfices privés. Doit-on aller plus loin que la loi ?


  • Christian At
  • Nathalie Chappe
  • Pierre-Henri Morand
  • Lionel Thomas


This paper studies the optimal managerial compensation when the shareholders may invest in private protection to reinforce their protection. The optimal contract exhibits three tolls: the wage, the level of dividends (which is equivalent to the level of diversion) and the level of private protection. Under asymmetric information, we show that investing in private protection does not necessarily reduce the level of profit diverted. Classification JEL : G34, D82.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian At & Nathalie Chappe & Pierre-Henri Morand & Lionel Thomas, 2007. "Protection des actionnaires et bénéfices privés. Doit-on aller plus loin que la loi ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(6), pages 1207-1220.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_586_1207

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    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design


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