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L'efficacité dynamique du brevet versus son inefficience statique. Un compromis utilisant l'exigence de nouveauté

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  • Gilles Koléda

Abstract

There is a well-known tradeoff between dynamic efficacy and static inefficiency created by the patent system existence. In this article, we stress on the possibility to realize an arbitrage between these two effects by setting the novelty requirement, or height of the patent. We integrate into the Grossman and Helpman (1991) quality ladders growth model framework both the heterogeneity of the increment of quality and the obligation for innovators that the qualitative increment of their invention overpasses a statutory threshold set by the Patent Office: the Patent’s Novelty Requirement. We examine the advantage and the opportunities open by this regulation of innovation and growth by setting the patent’s novelty requirement. Classification JEL : O34, 040.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilles Koléda, 2007. "L'efficacité dynamique du brevet versus son inefficience statique. Un compromis utilisant l'exigence de nouveauté," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(4), pages 789-806.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_584_0789
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laffond, Gilbert & Laine, Jean, 2000. "Representation in majority tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 35-53, January.
    2. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    3. Hartvigsen, David, 2006. "Vote trading in public elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 31-48, July.
    4. Fishburn, Peter C, 1971. "The Theory of Representative Majority Decision," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(2), pages 273-284, March.
    5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    6. Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2006. "Stability and Manipulation in Representative Democracies," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 669.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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