Lobbying pour les permis négociables et non-neutralité du mode d'allocation
In an agency model of politics, we show that the choice of an allocation method for tradable emissions permits is not neutral. The decision of a “corrupted” government to auction the permits or to grant them for free affects their equilibrium quantity and price as it modifies the incentive of capital owners of a polluting industry to lobby for or against emissions abatement. Classification JEL : D78, H23, Q28
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